Sunday, August 21, 2011

When the religious refuse to say what they are - two sources launching a subtle attack on Keynes simultaneously

Two recent articles have come out that made me twitch, not just because of their nature, but the underhanded way in which they were written. The first is a WSJ op-ed, which anyone who consistently reads newspapers quickly discovers is a dismal op-ed section to read. In this op-ed by Stephen Moore the author pretty much says everything US President Obama is doing is wrong because in his (Moore's) household this sort of thing would never fly - this might pique the memory of those who've consistently read this blog because I discussed this sort of equivalence between a household's expenditures and a nation's in my first blog entry Breaking Ground - it's intellectually unsound.

It's so intellectually unsound that Paul Krugman tore into Moore in his own blog, and it's worth the short read, if only because Krugman is slowly starting to put a smile on my face again and I'm hoping he keeps it up.

The thing with my blog, though, is that I have a rule of sorts. I promised myself that when I made this it would not just be a news feed of "oh this person said something worth reading - go read it." I promised myself it would have to contain more - at the very least a linking of two things that had a plausible connection - and for me to then back up why I claim what I claim. That way the reader gets something they can't get anywhere else (and if you can please put it in the comments - I want to read what you're reading) and it also gives me practice at my trade.

So, in that vein, I stumbled across an article in Forbes. This time, instead of a political pundit carrying his Master's in economics in tow to the WSJ op-ed section, this article is writen by a professor from the Canadian McGill University, Reuven Brenner. McGill is a very good university, one of the top in Canada, and you'd be doing well for yourself in the "education" economy to have their name on a diploma of your own - so attacking someone who's got the name McGill behind them as well as Brenner's publishing history isn't exactly an easy thing to do academically. I'd suspect it'd take someone like Krugman or Stiglitz or Jamie Galbraith to get a journal article out to formally attack Brenner's formal academic work.

But what Brenner wrote in Forbes was not formal academic work - it's nothing short of a misleading, and borders on just being a lie. Brenner equivocates that it is, in fact, the Keynesians who are a bunch of hacks making up "jargon" such that economics is too hard for people to understand (the same argument made in the WSJ), and that furthermore the Keynesians are really just a bunch of "religious" nuts. Suffice to say, this makes me want to grind my axe - but not in self-defense because I feel I need to rally to Keynes' side - rather because it's a psychological projection scenario to distract from how neoclassical economics is the real religion in economic thought right now, and by somehow writing this stuff in op-eds, provide proof of its existence and thus an informal logical fallacy takes place - argument from repetition.

If anything is religious in economics right now, it's the Chicago School/Mont Pelerin/Neoliberal modes of economic thought that Hayek & Friedman propagated from Thatcher & Reagan forward. The adherence to the "rules" of their ideas, or as Canterbury put in his Brief History of Economics that “there is more than a marginal connection between the objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand…and Milton Friedman’s monetarist philosophy” all ends up boiling down to a belief that there's no way it can be in any way wrong no matter what. It has to be right because they say it's "supposed" to be happening according to their theory, and even if it isn't, it's because it hasn't happened yet - but they're completely right. Or, as Paul Krugman put it in another one of his blog posts regarding Sweden,
Robin and I were talking yesterday with an eminent American financial economist, and said something about tax levels here. He said, “Well, that’s why all the young people are leaving.” Except, you know, they aren’t. But never mind — that’s what’s supposed to be happening, and it must be happening.
On Keynes, and I mean this in the sense of Davidson and not someone like Samuelson that picked and chose from Keynes such that it became a hatchet job more closely resembling neoclassical economics albeit with the addition of a decidedly non-Adam Smith military enterprise, there's plenty of scientific modeling that can be applied that doesn't just depend on a set of rules playing out in a sort of historical determinism. Neoclassicals don't have the power of Marx's qualitative sociological position (even though he too was wrong about the historical outcome, a point Gilbert made on his American inequality book) but yet neoclassicals will claim, despite no quantitative or qualitative reason to back it up, that their idea must be right simply because they say it is so.

And that makes the neoclassical school right now a religion - unlike the Keynesianism Brenner is trying to discredit. If you don't believe me just go do some research for yourself. Feel free to dissent in the comments - your dissent is encouraged and welcomed, but I'll stand by my position.

Edit: It seems that the above may have been misconstrued by some readers as my intent was not clear in this work, so I will seek to clarify. The point of this blog has not been to "rally to the defense" of Keynes or any of his intellectual kin like Davidson, Samuelson, or Minsky - indeed a BBC article taking an argument similar to mine  (but without the critique) is calling the current neoclassical collapse a lead-up to a "Minksy Moment" - rather the point of the above blog was to point out intellectual dishonesty. The neoclassical economic arguments are losing their quantitative foundations despite attempts at retrenchment, leaving them only with qualitative suggestions about what should happen according to their ideas - which is historical determinism - and despite that it's not happening. That's why I pointed out the bit from Gilbert above where he states that Marx's projection of how class awareness vis-a-vis property would lead to class struggle has not panned out - but Marxists will claim it eventually will - and that too is historical determinism. The difference between the neoclassical thoughts and the Marxists ones is that while Marx's qualitative arguments are still with considerable merit, and thus historical determinism might still be at play, the neoclassical arguments are also losing the qualitative foundations.

Which is a long-winded academic way of saying that there are still capital relations that Marx describes that are ongoing - the labor strikes in Wisconsin and the current strikes at Verizon just as two off-the-top of my head things - and so in that way Marx's qualitative foundations are still at play. Neoclassicals make arguments about how taxation will, qualitatively speaking, lead future capitalists to flee for better waters to make profit - a point that Krugman raised in his blog - but yet this is not occuring. So what Marx said would occur is, but what the neoclassicals are saying is not.

Thus while Keynes, like Marx, still has scientific ground to stand on - the neoclassicals simply do not have anything. Their ideas are becoming much more rooted in faith rather than science - which makes them religious - but rather than try to rebuff the academic beatings their field is taking they're resorting to psychological projection in an effort to provide proof that they're right simply because it's been said so many times. There is a real academic debate afoot about whether or not there is a religious element in neoclasiscal economic thought, but rather than hash this out academically as would be prudent, they're jumping straight to the op-ed section of major newspapers which provide a false sense of proof by authority.

This blog was about intellectual dishonesty - not whether or not Keynes was more right than Marx.

Friday, August 19, 2011

The "Pliant Corporate Citizen" - aka - when it rains it's probably because the storm began brewing awhile ago.

So, here we are again, on the subject of the SEC. It goes without saying that, in the context of everything said in prior posts, I've got grievances against how the SEC works. If America's economy had "managerial" capitalism then a lot of things going on wouldn't be happening if regulation really existed.

So there's another news break, but this time from Moody's. A whistleblower of sorts has come forward with a massive 80pg "comment" he wrote to the SEC about the corruption at Moody's (pot calling kettle, kettle come in please). This comment sparked interest at Business Insider who's done most of the leg work already in the sense that they've extracted the useful bits for those who don't want to tear through it all on their own.
  • Moody's ratings often do not reflect its analysts' private conclusions. Instead, rating committees privately conclude that certain securities deserve certain ratings--but then vote with management to give the securities the higher ratings that issuer clients want.
  • Moody's management and "compliance" officers do everything possible to make issuer clients happy--and they view analysts who do not do the same as "troublesome." Management employs a variety of tactics to transform these troublesome analysts into "pliant corporate citizens" who have Moody's best interests at heart.
  • Moody's product managers participate in--and vote on--ratings decisions. These product managers are the same people who are directly responsible for keeping clients happy and growing Moody's business.
  • At least one senior executive lied under oath at the hearings into rating agency conduct. Another executive, who Harrington says exemplified management's emphasis on giving issuers what they wanted, skipped the hearings altogether.
A lot of the above sounds like symptoms of the well-known fact that Moody's existed to take money from a client, tell the client what their product was worth, and then the client used that rating to sell it. Obviously there's a huge conflict of interest if you're giving objective ratings like "this is a piece of crap, you should be ashamed to try to sell it" because if you do then your clients, and your clients are quite few, are not likely to come back. So you give the client what they want by taking their financial product to the financial Maaco (for those who don't know, Maaco is a company famous in the US for offering very cheap paint / body work for cars...and it's not known for quality) where they slap a fresh shiny paint of bullshit on the product that lasts just long enough for the bank to resell it and get rid of it before the paint starts peeling.

Business Insider reached out to Moody's to get a comment, but unsurprisingly Moody's never returned the phone calls. If there's one thing Wall Street knows it's that any news that comes out on Friday is "take out the trash day" (hat tip to Aaron Sorkin for that West Wing episode) because everyone dumps all of their unpleasant news on Friday so that hopefully it gets lost in the noise, and even if it doesn't, there's a full weekend of time for some other distracting bit to come up and make people not care. Want an example of distraction? Take the phone hacking scandal at News of the World in the UK - then the riots happened - notice anyone talking about News of the World anymore?

Welcome to your short attention span society. Context matters people. The biggest gift you can ever give to yourself is to read things, step back, and put it into a broader perspective / narrative. At least for this writer - it's how I survive.

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

Taibbi vs. SEC - and how this is no different than the old USSR Communist Party

Matt Taibbi is a fantastic journalist. He started out covering what he could get to on foot within his means, and thanks to that he's written up one of the best examples of journalism that came out of the 2003 A.N.S.W.E.R march, likely one of the largest demonstrations to occur in America since the civil rights era, and published to Counter-Punch (hardly the most read journalism online). From there he evolved, moving through his time at The Daily Beast to eventually land a job at Rolling Stone. Rolling Stone has never shied from the political as some people reading this might be old enough to remember the lifetime of Hunter S. Thompson who got his feet wet writing for The Nation before eventually moving into writing for Rolling Stone. Taibbi's writing is a lot like Thompson, and thanks to the increase in resources he has with his more "establishment" position at Rolling Stone he's been able to go out and do more investigative journalism that requires the most important thing every activist usually lacks - money. 

With that Taibbi has written powerful stuff - and I do mean powerful. Right after the 2010 mid-term election Taibbi joined with a roundtable at Rolling Stone, including the vaunted right-wing neoliberal David Gergen, where both Taibbi and Gergen get into a little spat over whether or not Taibbi is right in calling the Tea Party crazy. I liked that writeup not only for Taibbi's political foresight - as we all know now that the Tea Party is crazy enough to hold the US hostage in what amounted to political/economic terrorism to get what they wanted or they'd crash the US economy into an iceberg - but also because the way Taibbi argued with the rest of them was just comical. The comedy from that article sticks out to me because I was waiting at a pharmacy for my scripts to be filled, and despite running a fever and feeling of death I was laughing so hard I thought I was going to lose my lungs amidst a cacophany of coughing and laughing in a completely empty Walgreens at 2am. 

So suffice to say that Taibbi has become a bit of an established pundit that likes to throw hard punches: from his blog to his normal journalism to his books - Taibbi has established a name for himself. I'm quite happy for the man, he's not going to win any awards for looks so GQ is never going to call him up to try to sell him as the "sexy and smart" journalist of today - he gets by doing what journalists are supposed to do to everyone: ask questions, catch mistakes, and tell the goddamned story. It'd bring a tear to my eye if they weren't blocked shut with years of cynicism.

All of the above is to exemplify that I believe Matt Taibbi to be a source of considerable veracity. I like the way he writes and I know he checks his sources before he puts his name on anything to be published. For that reason I'm enjoying his new article on the SEC, which I'll just take some quotes from for you.

In at least one case, according to Flynn, investigators at the SEC found their desire to investigate an influential bank thwarted by senior officials in the enforcement division – whose director turned around and accepted a lucrative job from the very same bank they had been prevented from investigating. In another case, the agency farmed out its inquiry to a private law firm – one hired by the company under investigation. The outside firm, unsurprisingly, concluded that no further investigation of its client was necessary. To complete the bureaucratic laundering process, Flynn says, the SEC dropped the case and destroyed the files.
[...]
Even a cursory glance at a list of the agency's most recent enforcement directors makes it clear that the SEC's top policemen almost always wind up jumping straight to jobs representing the banks they were supposed to regulate.
 [...]
Imagine the LAPD politely asking a gang of Crips and their lawyers to issue a report on whether or not a drive-by shooting by the Crips should be brought before a grand jury – that's basically how the SEC now handles many preliminary investigations against Wall Street targets.
[...]
The evolution toward this self-policing model began in 2001, when a shipping and food-service conglomerate called Seaboard aggressively investigated an isolated case of accounting fraud at one of its subsidiaries. Seaboard fired the guilty parties and made sweeping changes to its internal practices – and the SEC was so impressed that it instituted a new policy of giving "credit" to companies that police themselves. In practice, that means the agency simply steps aside and allows companies to slap themselves on the wrists. In the case against Seaboard, for instance, the SEC rewarded the firm by issuing no fines against it.
According to Lynn Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC, the Seaboard case also prompted the SEC to begin permitting companies to hire their own counsel to conduct their own inquiries. At first, he says, the process worked fairly well. But then President Bush appointed the notoriously industry-friendly Christopher Cox to head up the SEC, and the "outside investigations" turned into whitewash jobs. "The investigations nowadays are probably not worth the money you spend on them," Turner says.
[...]
But even if SEC officials manage to dodge criminal charges, it won't change what happened: The nation's top financial police destroyed more than a decade's worth of intelligence they had gathered on some of Wall Street's most egregious offenders. "The SEC not keeping the MUIs – you can see why this would be bad," says Markopolos, the fraud examiner famous for breaking the Madoff case. "The reason you would want to keep them is to build a pattern. That way, if you get five MUIs over a period of 20 years on something similar involving the same company, you should be able to connect five dots and say, 'You know, I've had five MUIs – they're probably doing something. Let's go tear the place apart.'" Destroy the MUIs, and Wall Street banks can commit the exact same crime over and over, without anyone ever knowing.
Getting the picture I take it? So lets put this into the context of this blog where I said in my prior post that the SEC was investigation S&P, and that I didn't think it was a conspiracy to ruin S&P's reputation, but rather an actual investigation. True, the Bloomberg article I cited doesn't clarify whether it's a "matter under inquiry" or an actual "investigation" - it might just be the former, which meant the Bloomberg article is just a means to make S&P pay its bribes to the SEC and hire off a few of the top dogs; however, if it really is an investigation, then who knows. S&P could just be made a patsy for all sorts of financial wrongs - when it's fairly obvious from a forensic accounting viewpoint that pretty much all of Wall Street was neck-deep in financial wrongs for at least a decade - but that's just speculation since the SEC hasn't properly investigated a damned one of them.

The point, broadly speaking, is that more stuff is coming out at just how inept the "commanding heights" of America's economy is. "Commanding heights" is a term coined by Lenin to describe the most important aspects of a nation's economy - for him it was the coal mines, the ironworks, all the basic things from which production sprang - but for a globalized deindustrialized service economy called America the "commanding heights" are the skyscrapers of Wall Street. It explains why the US Treasury department and the SEC so weakly enforce them, like the point the movie Syriana made with the remark that "corruption is why we win" and it had a good point. If you only have minor fluctuations from day to day, but everyone is "in the know" that the system is generally protected by lots of backroom quasi-legal off-the-record deals then you have a lot less to worry about. The lead up to the 2007 crisis was seen as no big deal because, surely, the Federal Reserve wasn't about to let Wall Street go down due to their own attempts to leverage profits to levels so high the mind can't comprehend them without aid of some multi-variate calculus and differential equations. The 2007 crash was a result of a systemic crisis where everything had been pushed too far, rather than just one bad firm the whole system was bad - or as Alan Greenspan put it himself:
I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, for such is that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders.
So Greenspan is willing to admit that companies really won't protect their shareholders in their search for profit. Banks were willing to take extreme risks knowing that they could buy off SEC enforcement, and that even in the event that they egregiously failed the Federal Reserve would either buoy them for as long as they needed (as they're doing right now with QE1, QE2, and now near-0 interest and probably QE3 when the Hooverism comes home to roost from the Tea Party's hostage taking) or the Federal Reserve would force other banks to support them. They expected law enforcement to be able to be bribed away and for the system's quasi-legal backroom deals to protect them regardless.


I was reading an interview Der Spiegel did with former General Secretary of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev where he had these apt words to describe the problem he was trying to solve in the 1980s with the USSR - "The party establishment didn't need perestroika. Each of them had it made."

Sounds kinda familiar doesn't it? Sounds kinda like the way the top levels of the SEC works when it comes to enforcing law violations by banks. Sounds kinda like the way  the revolving door of pretty much every part of the US government works, not just federal but state and even local, where the best answer to getting ahead in life is to make it into the "good ole' boy" club and ride the coattails of cronyism as far as you can. The difference between the USSR and the USA is that the USSR was stuck with the Socialism in One Country ideology, whereby the USSR had to make it on its own, but the USA is exporting its problems while sucking in capital from every part of the world. Not just in the way that the US demanded debt repayment post-WW2 that led to the burgeoning economic growth in the post-war era, but how that was extended way past it's "neoclassical discipline" structure by the introduction of credit cards, then securitization, and then derivatives - and every other thing you can think up.

Modern America's "commanding heights" are maintained by its so-called "financial engineers," trying anything to keep it going, and right now the only thing doing that is the fact that the world quite likely would be in very dire straits if its biggest consumer suddenly stopped consuming. So despite it being bad for them in the long run, it'd be even worse in the short run - so they keep buying US Treasuries - and it's the same story for America's domestic investors.

Edit: The bureaucracy argument actually works better than you'd think as a recent Gallup poll showed only the District of Columbia actually believing the US economy was improving.

Edit 2: In a follow up to this this Wall Street Journal's "MarketWatch" is reporting, via Senator Chuck Grassley, that the SEC may have destroyed as many as 9,000 documents. I'm well aware how questionable the WSJ can be, especially their op-ed section that's always been very pro-status quo and after the Murdoch buyout that's bled over into their political news reporting; however, the WSJ still does some good market news stuff from time to time - and it's nice to have other sources corroborate people like Taibbi.  The WSJ did a fantastic, and I do mean absolutely jaw-droppingly fantastic, article on the nature of California's police in the Great Recession - and how they're neglecting basic policing duties like robberies and even homicides - all so they can catch people with cannabis to be able to seize their property and resell it to keep the police departments funded amidst budget cuts.

Tuesday, August 16, 2011

When in Rome...

I've posted recently about the S&P's downgrade of US Treasury bonds not having a lot to do with reality, and more to do with politics. Breaking Ground talked about how S&P made a $2 trillion error in their judgement, which meant they had no financial reason to make their decision, and instead fell back on a political judgment (because the US Congress took till the last minute - which any political scientist would likely say "so what" to). S&P had their reputation a bit bruised by that $2 trillion mistake, but they didn't stop there - S&P also downrated Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to AA+ as well. It would seem as if S&P had an axe to grind with the way finances were working in America - and pundits all around argued about whether their opinions held water - but the fundamentals of why S&P did what it did was never discussed. I mentioned in Breaking Ground that there really were issues at play that demanded some investigation.

The Italians basically did that earlier this month when they raided the offices of both S&P and Moody's "in a probe over suspected "anomalous" fluctuations in Italian share prices." Basically the Italian government may or may not have had reasons to do this - I take it that anyone reading this wouldn't be surprised if a government decided to create a red herring in the form of a criminal investigation in order to draw away attention from financial issues - but suffice to say the Italians did it. The thing is that it hasn't stopped there.

The US Securities and Exchange Commission is investigating S&P now not only to see whether or not S&P had grounds to lower US T-Bonds to AA+  (and whether or not procedures were followed) but also investigating whether or not S&P participated in front-running their own release with insider trading actions. I should take this moment to clarify that the SEC isn't the most stalwart of investigatory bodies, PBS Frontline's "The Madoff Affair" spent the entire episode making a joke of the SEC as Madoff survived extremely vigorous investigations - and he wasn't just front-running, but rather was running a full-on Ponzi scheme.

The Italians and the US are both gunning for the ratings agencies apparently, but what does that mean? Your guess is as good as mine, but I'll give you my thoughts. There's the obvious outcomes: either there's truth to the claims and S&P is actually engaging in illegal behavior or the opposite could be true and these investigations are merely attempts to sully the reputation of S&P so their ratings are no longer taken seriously (and also to act as a warning to the other two ratings agencies). The former wouldn't surprise me in the least, but the conspiracy theory idea doesn't seem to hold much water for me - namely because US T-Bonds were selling at a profit to the US (across the TIPS/non-TIPS spread) after S&Ps downgrade as stock markets started shitting themselves leaving people only with the more secure options - US Treasuries or gold. Gold might seem favorable to some, The University of Texas system bought $1 billion in physical gold as a hedge, but gold is only worth something if you own the physical product and have it secured (preferably next to your canned food, guns, and ammo since you're apparently abandoning the world financial system). There are, of course, Special Drawing Rights which could be used to create a new global reserve currency - but this simply hasn't picked up steam.

Suffice to say that when times are tough and people are panicky they invest in something they're reasonably certain will keep their money safe. The really paranoid go for gold, and that's their right by all means, but the world isn't going to return to a gold standard or at least I hope not - the idea is insane not least of all for flooding effects if someone just suddenly tapped into a new gold vein and more generally the way Keynes described gold as, basically, "pouring money into a hole and then getting excited when you dig it back out" since gold has no intrinsic value. People are buying US T-bonds because despite all the paranoia, all the fear mongering, and everything else...people also like their TV, their hamburgers, and all those other "first world" accoutrement that come with the globalized world, and for that to stay in place the US economy can't just up and die one day. So investors pour their money into the US government and hope that somehow that pays off based on an incredible amount of even more money spent lobbying and strong-arming the US to do what capital wants it to do.

So what's that got to do with S&P? Chances are, if I were to gamble, S&P is probably doing things they shouldn't be doing. S&P might even have political motivations (based on the huge donations to the GOP) behind their debt ratings, which is bad enough to ruin their reputation forever, but if they're front-running as well then they're actually going to end up in prison most likely (or at least some patsies will). We're talking about a group of people that one other blogger described pretty harshly.
Look, I know these S&P guys. Not these particular guys — I don’t know John Chambers or David Beers personally. But I know the rating agencies intimately. Back when I was an in-house lawyer for an investment bank, I had extensive interactions with all three rating agencies. We needed to get a lot of deals rated, and I was almost always involved in that process in the deals I worked on. To say that S&P analysts aren’t the sharpest tools in the drawer is a massive understatement.

Naturally, before meeting with a rating agency, we would plan out our arguments — you want to make sure you’re making your strongest arguments, that everyone is on the same page about the deal’s positive attributes, etc. With S&P, it got to the point where we were constantly saying, “that’s a good point, but is S&P smart enough to understand that argument?” I kid you not, that was a hard-constraint in our game-plan. With Moody’s and Fitch, we at least were able to assume that the analysts on our deals would have a minimum level of financial competence.

I’ve seen S&P make far more basic mistakes than the one they made in miscalculating the US’s debt-to-GDP ratio. I’ve seen an S&P managing director who didn’t know the order of operations, and when we pointed it out to him, stopped taking our calls. Despite impressive-sounding titles, these guys personify “amateur hour.” (And my opinion of S&P isn’t just based on a few deals; it’s based on countless deals, meetings, and phone calls over 20 years. It’s also the opinion of practically everyone else who deals with the rating agencies on a semi-regular basis.)
All I can say is - ouch.  There's a lot of interesting stuff happening in political economy right now, and how it plays out will definitely affect the landscape of future attempts to reinvigorate interest in the ideas of the left. With the current debacles over the attempt to implement what is, in effect, a Republican healthcare plan requiring every American to enter into a private contract with a health insurance company (the Constitutionality of which is questioned) you have things like a recent report out of the UK which  showed the NHS to be one of the world's most efficient health care system in terms of costs - not surprisingly the US is one of the least efficient. If the US was serious about dealing with debt and demand suffocation within a capitalist narrative then the US should worry about a health care system that soaks up 15% of  its GDP. That's leaving alone all the talk of income inequalty and the never-ending wars / cost of empire, which I'm not going to get into again right now as I'm digressing too far as it is.

S&P's future is in doubt, that much is certain, and if this goes very badly then the fallout could be all the worse. It's going to be difficult to take debt ratings seriously at all if after the 2007-and-forward financial crisis, caused in large part by false evaluations, and then a ratings company tries to take on a nation-state only to be found to have made fraudulent claims that it fanned in an attempt to front-run the market to make a quick profit...that leaves some major questions about the financial system altogether. Questions that should have been asked a long time ago, but since everyone was "making money" hand-over-fist out of thin air no one wanted the party to stop.

Suffice to say I think if Marx was alive he'd have some great jokes to go with this.

Monday, August 15, 2011

This Day in History - Following the Advice of Milton Friedman, President Nixon ended the Gold Standard

I debated writing something up on this or not, but honestly a real break down of the nature of the Bretton Woods system and the post-Bretton world would be quite a lengthy post. Furthermore, to be authoritative, it'd need as much if not more citations than the post immediately preceding this one. So to be brief here's how Bretton Woods worked.
  • Post WW2 - the US controls most of the world's gold, mostly because a lot of countries owed the US money and paid it in gold
  • A lot of countries had US dollars
  • At the Bretton Woods Conference (hence the name of the system)  it was agreed that it would be simpler to use a system where the dollar was "pegged" to a certain value of gold ($32/troy ounce) and then countries could simply exchange dollars between one another based on this peg
    • In truth that's probably not a horrible idea, in basic principles, since paper is easier to move than gold.
  • John Maynard Keynes thought this idea was horrible and proffered the idea of Special Drawing Rights. A currency that only nation states can own, whose value is based on a "basket" of other currencies.
  • Several hundred billion SDRs exist today. You can Google around and find economists arguing that this should be the means by which accountability is reestablished in international accounts settling between nations
So in essence Bretton Woods was a system that benefited the US, because it allowed the US to hold a significant quantity of the world's gold, and be the creator of the world's means of settling debts between countries.  Arguments exist for why it was ended - the most plausible is that the US was mired in debt from its arms race with the USSR as well as the ever expanding cost of the Vietnam War; however, you can find arguments that since the USSR had significant gold deposits it could reasonably begin to build up a reserve of its own and attempt to usurp the dollar's position. I'll let you be the judge of that, and encourage you to read up on it if you're interested, because the issue is a debated one and there's no pure consensus - though I lean strongly to the US printing money to pay for Vietnam and thus being unable to maintain the gold peg.

If you want to read more, The Economist has an article on it for today.

Sunday, August 14, 2011

An Academic Look - The Root of American Income Inequality

The income gap in the United States (U.S.) is a subject that could potentially have many numerous explanations – but at its heart lies economics. From economics grows an income disparity, and from this, classes or “economic distinctions” (Gilbert 2008, 229). From this assumption this blog will progress through several theories from pre-eminent scholars in the field of macroeconomics to seek to shed light on the subject of income disparity. This work will progress in an almost longitudinal fashion, not only because this provides for a cogent logical path for an argument to develop, but also because it conveniently corresponds with the theory this blog seeks to posit.


The thesis of this blog is that the economic system envisioned by Adam Smith began the capitalist system of economics, his ideas laying the foundation from which Karl Marx was able to hypothesize that the system had inherent flaws, which were incapable of being addressed within the bounds of the system – and it is from this juncture that the work will move through the theories of John Maynard Keynes, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Milton Friedman to discuss how Marx’s view of capitalism as an inherently contradictory economic system was tested as attempts were made to modify capitalism within its bounds to metaphorically right the boat; however, as time has progressed, the economic effects Marx predicted have become to be so drastic (in term of income inequality) that this blog is being written to discuss the subject. This thesis is, at its heart, a structural argument regarding the incompatibility of capitalism to seek its goals within the bounds of the system (in other words, like I showed in Austerity and Disobedience - will the US follow the trend? where Nouriel Roubini argues that Marx is right and markets aren't working). The primary goal will be to find an explanation for the income gap in the U.S. from the 1980s forward, which this work posits Marx to have described, and to use the approaches of Keynes, Galbraith, and Friedman to buttress this conclusion toward the end of the work. 


A discussion on an income gap requires first that a common idea of the income system be in existence, which is where the system of capitalism comes in. This comes in four parts – the division of labor, the value of labor, free trade, and the invisible hand. First, Adam Smith began his idea with a simple theory – the division of labor to allow each worker to specialize in one area – where labor’s “productive powers” have seen their “greatest improvement” (Smith 1994, 3). Second, regarding the value of labor, Smith believed it to only matter in the “early and rude state of society which precedes both the accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land, the proportion between the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring different objects, seems to be the only circumstance which can afford any rule for exchanging them for one another” (Smith 1994, 53). Smith believed that “equal quantities of labour, at all times and places, may be said to be of equal value to the labourer…[but] he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness” (Smith 1994, 36). In other words, “Smith has the employer paying labor a wage differing from the value labor places on itself. Smith ends up making little use of a labor theory of value” (Canterbery 2001, 53). Third, free trade “is always advantageous, though not always equally so, to both [countries]” (Smith 1994, 521). Fourth, and perhaps the most powerful words, economically speaking, since Smith penned them: that an individual is

led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. (Smith 1994, 485)
Quite interestingly, the words “invisible hand” are found precisely once in the entirety of the work. Smith obviously wrote a great deal more about capital, the Wealth of Nations spans over 1,000 pages, but here lies the heart of it: division of labor and the “invisible hand.” The idea was simple: a worker produces best when the worker produces for their own self-interest, and furthermore, the natural division of labor created from such self-interest would create a more productive society. The metaphysical idea of the invisible hand is the idea of Smith that, beyond all others, would become the standard bearer of capitalism. Not to tangent, but to give example, the full extent of Smith’s humanism should be put into perspective.
Servants, labourers, and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of every political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, clothe, and lodge the whole body of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labor as to be themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged. (Smith 1994, 90)
It is in this way that Marx and Smith share a striking similarity – both have a tendency to have their ideas taken out of context; both authors have been used in ways that can only be described as either skirting their original intentions or outright changing the context so that the definitions lose meaning. For Smith his original idea was the division of labor and the invisible hand, acting in concert, would create a society of such plenty that there would not be such poor and miserable masses – Smith was afraid of the dangers of so called “jealousy of trade” where “merchants and manufacturers [would] lur[e] governments into believing that the protection of their profits was a precondition of both national security and national welfare” (Hont 2005, 62). This is why Smith encouraged free trade as this would “facilitate the specialization of labor because greater numbers of people consuming greater quantities give rise to the organization of more and more production in longer production runs in a factory system” (Canterbery 2001, 50). Quintessentially, Smith never foresaw capitalism to be an oppressive system, and the use of it to in fact protect certain commercial interests goes so far against the grain Smith laid as to arguably be an entirely different system, more akin to the mercantilist one Smith sought to replace, than the capitalism he envisioned. Yet the definitions have changed over time, but someone else foresaw how this would occur.
Karl Marx saw something in capitalism that was flawed. Marx saw a process in capitalism that, for the purposes of this work’s thesis regarding the U.S. income gap, has incredible explanatory power. The problem with using a Marxian analysis is not what Marx said per se, but rather how it has been carried forward. Much like Smith, Marx wrote exhaustively on his methods for his conclusions, but Marx had a flaw that was damaging: he “was correct in identifying the key sociological processes [but] he was historically wrong in predicting their outcome” (Gilbert 2008, 182). Unfortunately for the general dialog, Marx is remembered not for his analysis, but the way his ideas were used. When most people think of Marx, what they are really thinking of is Lenin and his Marxist-Leninist ideology whereby if the communist revolution will not come organically, then a vanguard must make it, and in the process form the communism Marx believed inevitable in a capital-based economy (Huckabee 2005). For the purposes of this blog this schism cannot be given the diligence it is due, but suffice to say, it is an important topic.
What matters for a Marxian analysis is his sociological analysis via his material dialectics all of which coalesces into an understanding where capital comes into play. Whereas Smith spoke of labor theory as unnecessary once society moved into a certain level of development, Marx’s entire dialectical process works on the idea of a labor theory of value, and it stands largely undefended in Marx’s writings. This is because when Marx penned the words he had no reason to defend them “given that the labor theory of value was widely accepted by his Ricardian contemporaries” (Harvey 2010, 60). Marx exemplifies this by what he calls “socially necessary” labor time, labor time necessary to manage to continue living, which is all a capitalist will pay for; however, the capitalist will have the worker labor for many hours beyond this, which is the genesis of surplus value – and thus “capital, therefore, is not only the command over labour, as Adam Smith thought. It is essentially the command over unpaid labour. All surplus-value, whatever particular form…is in substance the materialization of unpaid labour-time” (Marx 1976, 671-672). This is the heart of the Marxist analysis – in Canterbury’s (2001, 111) words the worker will be paid “a subsistence wage just sufficient to keep the worker alive, at work, and able to reproduce the commodity.” Anything beyond that will be accumulated by the capitalist not to be paid in wages. This is an incredibly simplistic summarization of Marx – his ideas of surplus value generation span all three volumes of Capital plus the Theories of Surplus Value; however, it contains the heart of the matter.
Marx first raised the issue of class consciousness because he believed that subjective awareness of one’s objective position in the property and occupational system would lead to a sense of belonging with others of similar position and promote conflict with those above or below. Marx’s conception assumes [a] causal sequence…objective class position leads to class consciousness, which in turn shapes political behavior (Gilbert 2008, 200).
Marx’s analysis works over long historical periods because the method works well to show what occurs in the sense of eventuality to the replacement of capitalism by socialism, and then communism. The danger lies in the impatience, which Lenin evidences. Marx’s theory works somewhat like quantum physics where an object has both a position and a velocity, but if you try to measure one you lose accuracy in the other. In other words, the harder you try to determine how quickly you’re moving toward socialism the more difficult it is to determine just how far from socialism you are, and vice versa. The method is an analytical one, disposed to examining the nature of capital relations, which is what Marx wrote thousands of pages on. That analytical method is the idea this work takes forward. The theories of Keynes, Galbraith, and Friedman will be discussed in a much shorter way with the intended purpose to place them in context in-between Smith and Marx in the conclusion.

“Keynesianism is premised on the argument that government could be an agent for increasing aggregate demand, either directly through increased federal spending or indirectly through reduced taxes to stimulate private consumption and investment” (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich 2008, 15) Keynes also implemented the investment multiplier effect where such government investment would generate increased consumption and even a bit of increased savings (Canterbery 2001, 219-220; Davidson 2007, 68-74). Within those tools Keynes was largely attacking (according to Canterbery (2001, 229) “with what some would say savagery”) the idea of the invisible hand leading to full employment. Keynes believed that there were “social and psychological justification[s] for significant inequalities of income and wealth, but not for such large disparities as [existed then]” – Keynes believed that “full employment policies were likely to reduce income inequality” (Davidson 2007, 6). Keynes’s ideas represent the anti-thesis to inflation-targeting policies – as these depend on a large unemployed labor force with no real safety nets so as to create “a ubiquitous and overwhelming fear [within] all members of society,” which has the effect of making workers “less truculent” (Davidson 2007, 166). Keynes’s approach to the economy was to generate sufficient demand so as to create a need for supply, and when the marginal propensity to consume was threatened by liquidity traps, refusal to expand even when interest rates were low, and a general stagnation of the economy became present – the need arose for the government to be the actor of last resort. Keynes justified this within the investment multiplier where the money would in fact create the necessary revenues in the long run to pay the government back, which with the economy restarted, could be recouped via taxes upon the now healthy economy.
The economy Keynes is associated with is the economy of the Great Depression, and some years later John Kenneth Galbraith set off to remind Americans that  “perhaps a fourth of the population remained poor in the midst of general prosperity” (Gilbert 2008, 206). Davidson (2007, 66) called Galbraith’s The Affluent Society an attempt to spark a “national discussion…weigh[ing] the relative merits or demerits of creating jobs through additional government spending” in various broad sectors such as “education…health…infrastructure…and additional consumption.” This is evidenced by Galbraith’s “Social Balance Theory” best described by the fact that “even public services that prevent disorder must [now] be defended. By contrast, the man who devises a nostrum for a nonexistent need and then successfully promotes both remains one of nature’s noblemen” (Galbraith 1998, 199). Galbraith was describing, in 1958, what he saw as a quarter of the country living in poverty amidst, in one famous poetic description, the blight of decaying cities amidst the stench of rotting garbage – but Galbraith’s answer was not adopted. “The object of Galbraith’s economic writings is nothing less than the replacement of the neoclassical system” (Canterbery 2001, 339). What happened was the precise opposite with the theories of Milton Friedman, whom Galbraith called “the most influential economist of the twentieth century” (Canterbery 2001, 280).
Friedman personifies the idea of neoliberalism, which is enshrined within his theory of monetarism where “growth in the money supply is the primary determinant of economic performance” (Dolan, Frendreis, and Tatalovich 2008, 139). To put this into a literary perspective Canterbery  (2001, 278-279) shows “there is more than a marginal connection between the objectivist philosophy of Ayn Rand…and Milton Friedman’s monetarist philosophy.” Simply put, Friedman’s analysis boiled down to one simple premise: “government is the problem” (Friedman 1991). Only on “indivisible matters” like national defense did Friedman agree to government provision (Friedman 2002, 23) . Friedman discusses the idea of a negative income tax, but only as alleviation to poverty reduction programs with the goal of reducing government bureaucracy if government absolutely must have anti-poverty programs (Friedman 2002, 190-195).
So where does the income gap lie within these theories? Smith lays the groundwork for the economic system – but he does so with the express purpose of creating a wealthier society for all. Marx analyzes Smith’s capitalism via historical materialist dialectics and concludes that no such wealthier society for all can exist – the workers will always be squeezed in the process of capital accumulation. Then we move into Keynes whose theories are numerous, but focused around the idea that government deficits should create market demand to spur employment if unemployment became problematic. Galbraith moved further – painting his own literary anti-thesis of Norman Rockwell with regard to America’s economy – and wanted to reinvent the economic system; Galbraith was a powerful theorist with many ideas, but he was, on the whole, ignored. Friedman reinvigorated the neoclassical school, and adopted a mantra whereby government was virtually never the answer.
The income comes from the theory of Smith, Marx defines the structure whereby disparity is generated – and the remaining three theorists show how Marx’s historical materialist dialectical process is powerful. Keynes’s ideas were morphed “until the theory bore more resemblance to neoclassical economics than Keynes, the neoclassical heretic, could ever have intended” (Canterbery 2001, 418). Military Keynesianism doesn’t just turn Keynes’s theories into a sort of war economics, but it destroys Keynes’s overarching logic. Simultaneously the neoliberals flatly ignored Smith’s insistence on paying for wars with taxes to bring them to an end (Smith 1994, 996).  Galbraith sought to create a new order, but was without a general audience. Friedman’s ideas proved that Marx’s historical conclusion had not “anticipated[d] the aspirations of the working class for a capitalistic lifestyle” (Canterbery 2001, 118).
Traditional moralists point to any hedonistic doctrine as the creed of the children of darkness, because it has no real escape from egotism. But since it thinks it has, it illustrated the stupidity of the children of light, rather than the malice of the children of darkness. It must be observed of course that the children of darkness are well able to make use of such a creed. Utilitarianism’s conception of the wise egotist, who in his prudence manages to serve interests wider than his own, supported exactly the same kind of political philosophy as Adam Smith’s conception of the harmless egotist, who did not even have to be wise, since the providential laws of nature held his egotism in check. So Jeremy Bentham’s influence was added to that of Adam Smith in support of a laissez-faire political philosophy; and this philosophy encouraged an unrestrained expression of human greed at the precise moment in history when an advancing industrialism required more, rather than less, moral and political restraint upon economic forces. (Niebuhr 1944, 29-30)
It is the opinion of this author that every theorist presented is a child of light in the Niebuhr sense – they sought to do good for the world. Smith sought to create a world of plenty, Keynes sought to breakdown inequality by providing more employment where Smith’s framework was falling short, Galbraith sought to do away entirely with neoclassical economics so as to reinvent the capital system, Friedman sought to vindicate the neoclassical school with a monetary theory to provide for a new roadmap to growth, and Marx provided the dialectical process that stems all the way to this sentence. It is the conclusion of this blog that, in determining a conceptual model to explain the widening income gap in the U.S. that Karl Marx provides the best analytical tools. The present system of increasing low-wage job growth accompanied by high-wage job loss provides but one example of the shift in surplus value generation (National Employment Law Project 2011). It is not that one theorist was wrong or that another was right, but simply that Marx’s analytical tools provide the best method for seeing how the road came to this moment. Put another way: Smith begat the system which led to neoclassical progeny moving to perpetuate capital by adopting ideas from other schools, such as Keynesianism, in order to perpetuate itself in a manner resulting most recently in the unabashed monetarist-objectivist theories of Friedman – and all of this would have been seen by Marx. “Every limit [to capital] appears as a barrier to be overcome” (Marx 1973, 404). Thus, within the Marxian historical materialist dialectic, the process began as soon as Smith penned the idea – and as soon as capital was begat it would find any way to continue its metaphysical process of accumulation. The past 30 years increase in income disparity is but a part of this process.

Canterbery, E Ray. 2001.: A Brief History of Economics: Artful Approaches to the Dismal Science. Second. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing.

 
Davidson, Paul. 2007. John Maynard Keynes (Great Thinkers in Economics). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dolan, Chris J., John Frendreis, and Raymond Tatalovich. 2008. The Presidency and Economic Policy. Lanhan: Rowman & Littlefield.


Friedman, Milton. 2002. Capitalism and Freedom: Fortieth Anniversary Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.




Galbraith, John K. 1998. The Affluent Society. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.


Gilbert, Dennis L. 2008. The American Class Structure in an Age of Growing Inequality. Seventh. Thousand Oak: Pine Forge Press.


Harvey, David. 2010. A Companion to Marx's Capital. London: Verso.




Huckabee, Brittany. 2005. “Heaven on Earth: The Rise and Fall of Socialism.”


Marx, Karl. 1976. Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy. London: Penguin Books.


———. 1973. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. London: Penguin Books.






Smith, Adam. 1994. The Wealth of Nations. ed. Edwin Cannan. New York: Random House.

Friday, August 12, 2011

Austerity and Disobedience - will the US follow the trend?

Many readers here have probably some familiarity with the idea of austerity, which is today's topic, but what exactly does austerity mean to everyday people? It's easy to read of cuts to this or cuts to that, but to borrow a phrase from right-wing economic thinking, when does it trickle-down and start affecting the lives of everyday people. Most Americans have no real concept of this unless they've grown up in a family receiving state benefits and were old enough to be aware of what happened to the "end of welfare" / "beginning of workfare" in 1996 - when the Clinton Administration put an end to traditional welfare systems designed to push people back to work. Never mind that the number of people taken off the welfare rolls at the end of their time who never in turn found work was enormous - politicians were well aware that the economy did not have the jobs to employ all of these people and that what jobs were available weren't going to be taken up by people coming off welfare (typically low educational attainment, a criminal record relating to being poor, and probably some drug use). Austerity, then, was the cuts to those programs that left a lot of people even more detached from society then they already were. 

Which gets us to today's topic - is there a relationship between austerity and civil disobedience?

In the global perspective this answer should be almost patently obvious to those with a liberal arts education that consisted even modestly of any sort of reading - especially if Latin America was involved. Argentina's economic collapse around the turn of the millennial was largely amplified by economic austerity measures, and you can easily Google this topic to find any number of sources to read from. Take another country, Bolivia, and you'll find the same answer - except in Bolivia the final straw was the attempt to privatize the public water works, which culminated in massive protests and civil disobedience - though Bolivia's situation was amplified by the close proximity of the country's capitol to the very large disenfranchised poor majority of the country. You can find the same story in any country really, which has not all that surprisingly been the subject of some academic work.

Recently The Atlantic did an article comparing austerity and riots and in this article they provide the chart I provide here (from a journal article entitled Austerity and Anarchy: Budget Cuts and Social Unrest in Europe, 1919-2009 which was published by CEPR). The conclusion, as The Atlantic put it, is simple - "Austerity breeds anarchy. More cuts, more crime."

Edit: CHAOS is defined as - "the sum of demonstrations, riots, strikes, assassinations, and attempted revolutions in a single year in each country."

This chart might at first seem obscure, but with a little context it makes sense. The first white bar shows the effect on expenditure increases - they have low incidents - and for each bar afterward the effect is shown for expenditure decreases. In essence people get angry when government spending is cut, and the greater you cut it, the angrier people get. This is really not news to anyone except the Tea Party in the US right now, but as Al-Jazeera English put it, "The Republican Party is no longer the party of Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, Eisenhower, or even Reagan - the GOP in its current form is nothing more than the party of Ted Nugent."

So the link between austerity and disobedience is pretty well founded. There's ample quantitative data as the study shows, meaning even in the record of incidents where some qualitative experts might claim disobedience was hidden by not being recorded, there was a statistically significant correlation. Obviously, as I gave just a couple examples of before with Argentina and Bolivia, there is qualitative backing for those statistical findings. This is what we call "praxis" - the meshing of quant and qual - and when you've got both you've got strong ground to stand on. Austerity makes everyone quite angry, and more so the more austerity there is, leaving only the rich to think all is well.

So great, you might say. So what, you might say. What does this have to do with America, some might say - and that's precisely where this is going. Not just because this is a blog focused on America, but because in this instance, America is unique - and not in a good way.

I'll be the first to say that I have trouble citing the Wall Street Journal - not only because it's owned by News Corporation - but because it's in that certain "class" of newspapers with Investors Business Daily and even the Financial Times (though FT isn't as bad). These newspapers are quite obviously pro-capitalist, and not just in the sense that they're apologists, but to the point of skewing information and reporting to provide a picture that paints the capitalist mode of production more favorably. The need to have a strong public relations image of the economy is well-known, nothing can destroy an economy of any size worse than rumors, but these newspapers work much like propaganda to generate the narrative they need to make their readers believe in the safety of what the papers tells them, and the danger of what the paper tells them. Objectivity can be lost in this fray, and to that end it's not always fair to consider these as reputable journalistic sources.

First, though, some more context. I was quite happy when another blog I try to keep up with posted about how Nouriel Roubini thought Marx was right and capital is doing what Marx said it would...all in an interview with the Wall Street Journal. This borrows, of course, from most everything Marx wrote - but specifically with the way he used his own method of dialectics to show capital's inherent contradictory nature, which through enough dialectical processes (each dialectic never solves the original problem, which is how capital just keeps finding new ways to move its problems somewhere else...which is why securities and derivatives exist, for example) and is how Marx arrived at the whole "all history hitherto is the history of class struggle [between capital and labor - bourgeois and proletariat]."

Importantly, and I really do hope you go to the link above and watch that 20 minute video the WSJ put up, Roubini talks about how he envisages a future where there is a 50-50 shot of another recession in the US (remember when you read this that, like I mentioned in my first blog Breaking Ground, that 88% of economic growth was captured by corporate profits) he sees that if another recession takes place that there could truly be civil unrest in the United States. Not just because the economy is failing to produce, but because the way we escaped a depression last time won't be supported again. As Roubini says, it's going to be hard for Congress to pass another bank bailout while people are being shoved off the unemployment rolls - especially when US Congressional disapproval ratings are in the 80th percentile across numerous polls (screenshot since that website updates constantly) and their approval ratings have been trending this way for awhile. Roubini also mentions how the US needs more stimulus, which the US Congress is not likely to pass at all right now, and will likely face more rounds of Quantitative Easing (basically the central bank creating electronic money to buy assets from troubled banks - like mortgages or commercial paper). In summation - the US economy is in extremely hot water - and that's coming from a guy who foresaw the mortgage crisis quite well in advance.

So what's that got to do with civil disobedience? Well as this blog has endeavored to show - austerity breeds disobedience. The US is very likely to pass austerity measures of quite a dire nature in the near future with the way the Tea Party has taken control of the US legislature - a point which Paul Krugman summarized by saying, "After all, how can American democracy work if whichever party is most prepared to be ruthless, to threaten the nation’s economic security, gets to dictate policy? And the answer is, maybe it can’t." That's pretty much the point at which the US economy resides right now. A small minority has managed to control the government through what amounts to a ransom note - and there's no shortage of economists crying out about how bad this is. On the other side of the coin, this situation has people like Grover Norquist quite happy, as you can imagine, but as Roubini put it in his interview - the US had a 300 billion dollar surplus and then a 1 trillion dollar plus deficit over the span of one man's presidency (Bush) - that wasn't starving the beast, that was feeding it. Of course most of the readers of this probably aren't going to be surprised if I say Norquist is just a hack dragged out to scream about the "FairTax" and the deficit whenever the GOP needs to rally its largely uneducated base to drown out educated discourse in the media. For those curious about how all of that works, go read - What's the Matter with Kansas?: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America.

The point of this context is that America has no strong establishment that wants to buck against the austerity measures - the Vietnam War protestors now have mortgages, 401ks, IRAs, and probably some kids with student loans. Speaking of student loans I'm going to at this point turn to an excellent article posted on AlterNet today that summarizes up my final point - which saves me having to write it and lets you go cruise over to AlterNet to support their site if you can.

  1. Student-Loan Debt
  2. Psychopathologizing and Medicating Noncompliance
  3. Schools That Educate for Compliance and Not for Democracy
  4. "No Child Left Behind" and "Race To The Top"
  5. Shaming Young People Who Take Education - But Not Their Schooling - Seriously
  6. The Normalization of Surveillance (shameless plug for Thievery Corporation's new album - Culture of Fear)
  7. Television
  8. Fundamentalist Religion and Fundamentalist Consumerism

The majority of protestors against austeity are youths, which the above article tries to give some qualitative examples of. Lets not be naive enough, though, to think that a system is going to change just because some youths get angry and go smash things - it takes more than that - it takes broad support. To that end Dr. David Harvey likes to lament the "mortgage interest deduction" the US offers to homeowners to encourage them to buy a house - which is very unique to the US. Homeowners, as Harvey likes to point out, have been studied and found less likely to engage in civil disobedience / unrest because, surprise surprise, they have "more" to lose. Never mind the fact that they don't own their house so long as they have a mortgage on it - a fact a lot of Americans have come to realize lately - but for some reason just sitting in a house makes people more complacent about society.

So to come to a conclusion, austerity breeds disobedience. The US is entering into a period of austerity despite the economic need for the precise opposite (in the medium-run America needs to cut back spending, especially in defense, but right now it needs spending - a lot of it - if capitalism is to work). That austerity has, in other nation states, led to great civil unrest and unease about the economy and the government, which tends to undermine economic growth and stability thus causing knock-on effects to worsening the economic situation.

Will the US follow this trend? I don't know - I imagine there could be some civil unrest, but whether or not it will lead to riots is unknown. The US has a much better established police force, who are often protected from austerity measures unlike other countries, and those police officers will work to secure their cities because they're part of the system that's benefiting from the austerity (civil unrest means they have a reason to exist, right?). I imagine a lot of the things the police do that get cataloged in the video The Largest Street Gang in America will become more transpartent to people if civil unrest grows - and I imagine that the issue of video recordings of the police will become ever more contentious right up until the US Supreme Court weighs in. If SCOTUS comes down with a ruling that one cannot film the police, I'd like to think there would be a great deal of civil unrest, but then again maybe not.

The US has a history of being conditioned to state-sanctioned violence of all forms, especially against the "underclass" that so many Americans are joining day-by-day. Whether or not there will be an uprising is anyone's guess - but there are strong mechanisms in place to limit the possibility, and even stronger mechanisms to shut it down. America is home to the modern idea of capitalism - and you'd be a fool to think the rich are going to go down without one hell of a fight.